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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE GEORGE FISHER, JR. FAMILY 
INTER VIVOS REVOCABLE TRUST; 
LaRUE FISHER, individually; 
LaRUE FISHER, Settlor and 
Trustee of The George Fisher, 
Jr. Family Inter Vivos 
Revocable Trust Agreement; and 
BRENT ELMER FISHER, Co-Trustee 
of The George Fisher, Jr. 
Family Inter Vivos Revocable 
Trust Agreement, 
Plaintiffs, Appellants 
and Cross-Appellees, 
vs. 
MAX GEORGE FISHER and JOYCE 
FISHER, 
Defendants, Appellees 
and Cross-Appellants. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS AND CROSS-APPELLEES 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This Brief is a reply to those portions of the Brief of 
Appellees and Cross-Appellants, which are given in answer to 
Appellants' original Brief. It is also an answer to the cross-
appeal portions of Appellees' Brief and it is recognized that 
Appellees have opportunity to reply to that portion. Therefore, we 
shall designate the separate portions as REPLY BRIEF and RESPONSE 
TO CROSS-APPEAL. 
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Case No. 940577-CA 
Priority Rule 29(b)(15) 
The Appellees have not clearly indicated in their Brief 
which portions are in answer to Appellants' appeal and which 
portions are directed to the cross-appeal. With apologies to 
Appellees, we shall therefore first attempt to analyze Appellees' 
Brief by indicating which portions are in answer to Appellants' 
original Brief and which portions are in support of the cross-
appeal. We shall do that by restating the issues from our original 
Brief and then indicate which portions of the Brief of Appellees 
appear to be responsive to our original appeal; and then we shall 
indicate which portions of Appellees' Brief introduce new subjects 
to which we shall respond but to which Appellees also are entitled 
to reply. 
I. DID GEORGE FISHER, JR., NOW DECEASED, MAKE AN ORAL AGREEMENT 
WITH APPELLEE MAX FISHER POSTPONING PAYMENTS DUE UNDER THE 
ESCROW AGREEMENT? 
It will be noted that this issue is limited to an oral 
agreement "postponing payments due," which accords with issue #b as 
stated in our Notice of Appeal "that annual payments start on 
demand by the plaintiffs." (R. 295) In other words, Appellants do 
not challenge the finding of an oral modification of the Escrow 
Agreement but do challenge the portion which states that annual 
payments are to start at the rate of $10,000 per year upon demand. 
Appellees, on the other hand, challenge the very existence of a 
valid oral modification agreement because of the statute of frauds. 
Appellants raised the issue of the statute of frauds under issue #3 
of our Brief at pages 18-20 and 36-39. 
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Appellants therefore submit that Appellees have made no 
answer to this narrow issue: "Assuming that there was a valid oral 
modification of the Escrow Agreement as to installment payments, 
did it include the provision that when demand is made, annual 
payments will commence?" Since their Brief does not address this 
issue, it will not be further addressed in this Brief, except to 
take issue with one statement. At pages 2-3 Appellees' Brief 
states: 
Plaintiffs' requested standard of review on this 
case (non-deferential review) is unfounded. The 
criminal case cited by Plaintiffs does not apply to 
contractual intent or payment agreements such as 
the one at bar, nor does it support Plaintiffs' 
requested standard of review on this issue. 
II. WAS APPELLANT LARUE FISHER, WIFE OF DECEASED GEORGE FISHER, 
JR., BOUND BY THE ACTIONS OF GEORGE FISHER, JR.? 
This same narrow issue is involved in this point. Even 
if LaRue Fisher is somehow held bound by the actions of her 
husband, the deceased George Fisher, Jr., that binding effect must 
be limited to the things of which she was aware. There is no 
testimony that she was ever made aware of the possibility that her 
husband had in mind any deferment of an entire schedule of annual 
payments of $10,000 per year. This issue also has not been 
addressed specifically by the Appellees and will also be submitted 
to the Court on the basis of Appellants' original Brief. 
III. ASSUMING THAT AN ORAL AGREEMENT WAS MADE, IS IT VOID BECAUSE 
OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS? 
This point is comparable to issue #1 of Appellees' Brief. 
Appellees take the position that the statute of frauds applies to 
the entire theoretical oral modification of the agreement but make 
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the additional objection that the conversations between George and 
Max Fisher were not sufficiently specific as to terms to constitute 
a meeting of the minds which would support an agreement. 
Appellants therefore do not disagree with that contention of 
Appellees, although our original Brief limited the application of 
the statute of frauds to the question of whether the agreement 
amounted to a postponement of the commencement of annual payments 
until demand was made. We don't care whether this Court upholds an 
oral modification, so long as it does not include merely commence-
ment of a schedule of payments following demand. 
IV. WAS A PAYMENT FOR CATTLE SOLD IN 1979 PROPERLY ALLOWED BY THE 
COURT AS A PAYMENT ON THE CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF PROPERTY? 
This issue is addressed under Appellees Argument V-B at 
page 40-41 of Appellees' Brief. This will be replied to. 
V. WAS THE REMEDY OF FORFEITURE AS SOUGHT BY THE APPELLANTS 
INEQUITABLE UNDER THE FACTS BEFORE THE COURT? 
This is answered by Appellees under their issue #IV, 
which has the same number in their argument at pages 32-38. Reply 
will be made on this issue. 
VI. SHOULD THE COURT HAVE ALLOWED APPELLANTS' ATTORNEY FEES? 
Appellees do not answer this issue as raised by 
Appellants. Without stating it as an issue, in the last paragraph 
of their Argument, which should be VII, Appellees ask for their own 
attorney's feesf which is, in effectf an objection to the awarding 
of attorneys fees to Appellants. This issue will be addressed as 
a reply. 
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The Appellees do raise issues which are clearly issues of 
the cross-appeal, as we shall herein endeavor to indicate: 
APPELLEES II: The Trial Court improperly refused to apply 
the statute of limitations to the majority of yearly installment 
payments under the Escrow Agreement when Plaintiffs failed to 
pursue action within the six year period. 
Also, APPELLEES III: The Trial Court improperly failed 
to apply the equitable doctrines of waiver, estoppel, and laches in 
this case when George Fisher told Defendant not to make the yearly 
installment payments and Defendant acted in reliance upon these 
representations for approximately 15 years without reprisal. 
And APPELLEES V: Plaintiffs have failed to properly 
marshalled the evidence to show clear error on the factual issues 
they wish to appeal. 
And APPELLEES VI: In finding that the contract had been 
modified, the Trial Court erred by concluding that interest 
continued to accrue on the contract principle when all the evidence 
indicated that continued accrual was never contemplated by the 
parties, George Fisher did not expect interest to accrue and the 
payments were waived by both George and LaRue Fisher. 
REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
I. DID GEORGE FISHER, JR., NOW DECEASED, MAKE AN ORAL AGREEMENT 
WITH APPELLEE MAX FISHER POSTPONING PAYMENTS DUE UNDER THE 
ESCROW AGREEMENT? 
As indicated in our Preliminary Statement (P. 3), we have 
no real quarrel with the statement of Defendants in Appellees' 
-5-
Brief that they challenge the making of an oral modification on 
grounds of the statute of frauds. The question is whether the 
Trial Court's finding that George Fisher and Max Fisher 
contemplated the demand for payment would commence a duty to make 
annual payments of $10,000 each and whether that issue required a 
different standard of review than the clearly erroneous standard 
requiring a marshalling of the evidence as to the existence of the 
agreement in general (Appellants' Brief, Pp. 2-3). The decision of 
the Trial judge was that 
The parties never specifically addressed the issue 
as to whether all payments would become due when 
George requested payments to commence. 
and then: 
The court finds that the agreement between Max and 
George to amend the contract did not contemplate 
that all prior payments became due immediately upon 
the request of the sellers. It was contemplated 
and agreed that payments would be delayed and 
commenced again when George requested them. (R. 
257, LI. 15-20) 
Since this is speculation as to what might have been in the minds 
of the parties, we suggested that no deference should be given to 
that decision of the Trial Court. This Court should make its own 
decision on the evidence. If we were wrong, and if the evidence 
should be marshalled, then we did marshal all of the evidence on 
the subject in our original Brief (see Pp. 11-13). 
The two cases cited by Appellees in their Brief do not 
help. Fitzgerald v. Carbide, 793 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1990), and 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Sohm, 755 P.2d 144, 158-59 (Utah 
1988), both involve interpretation of written agreements as to 
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ambiguities. In our case the issue is whether unuttered statements 
can form an agreement as a Finding of Fact or whether that is 
speculation to be reviewed without deference. If this Court agrees 
with us, it must substitute its own opinion on the evidence for 
that of the Trial Court. If this Court agrees with the Appellees, 
then we have marshalled all the evidence and the Court can review 
that evidence and see whether the Trial Judge correctly assessed 
what was in the minds of the parties, even though not addressed by 
them. 
II. WAS APPELLANT LaRUE FISHER, WIFE OF DECEASED GEORGE FISHER, 
JR., BOUND BY THE ACTIONS OF GEORGE FISHER, JR.? 
As previously stated, there is no response from Appellees 
on this point. They contend that the statute of frauds prevents 
the finding of any agreement modifying the original agreement. If 
the Court finds against Appellees on that point, the argument of 
Plaintiffs under Point II is still submitted as being valid and 
LaRue Fisher is not bound. 
III. ASSUMING THAT AN ORAL AGREEMENT WAS MADE, IS IT VOID BECAUSE 
OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS? 
As stated in our Preliminary Statement, Plaintiffs have 
no objection to the Trial Court's finding that there was an oral 
modification of the Escrow Agreement. That avoids the issue of the 
statute of limitations. We challenge the Trial Court's finding or 
conclusion that the parties contemplated that when demand for 
payment was made, it would commence a schedule of payments at 
$10,000 per year. We have covered that in our Argument in Point I 
of this Brief. 
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IV. WAS A PAYMENT FOR CATTLE SOLD IN 1979 PROPERLY ALLOWED BY THE 
COURT AS A PAYMENT ON THE CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF PROPERTY? 
Appellees' Brief suggests that the finding was supported 
by the evidence and they cite the finding and then in a footnote 
refer to only a portion of the testimony of Max Fisher. Their 
Brief states that we have failed to marshal the evidence. We 
submit that all the evidence was marshalled in our original Brief 
(see Pp. 20-22) and that the only testimony which supports the 
finding is the bald assertion by Max and echoed by his wife that 
the cattle were their cattle. All the documentary evidence and the 
admissions of Joyce Fisher that the sale was not reported as their 
sale to their accountant or on their income tax returns are 
contrary to the finding. The evidence has been marshalled and we 
submit that the finding is "clearly erroneous" since no weight was 
given to the evidence which was made concurrently with the trans-
action, all of which made the sale out to be a sale of the George 
Fisher, Jr. cattle. If the Court believes Max' and Joyce's 
testimony now, they were income tax evaders in 1979. 
V. WAS THE REMEDY OF FORFEITURE AS SOUGHT BY THE APPELLANTS 
INEQUITABLE UNDER THE FACTS BEFORE THE COURT? 
This matter was addressed in our original Brief at pages 
22-24. Whether forfeiture would be inequitable is a matter of 
judgment. The Trial Judge was entitled to his judgment and this 
Court is required to substitute its judgment as to whether 
forfeiture would be inequitable and also as to what the alternative 
should be if forfeiture would be inequitable. The Trial Judge did 
not consider any balance of the equities. The Trial Court gave no 
-8-
consideration to the fact that the Defendants have been in 
possession of this property for twenty years, have made their 
living from the property, have paid their expenses including the 
costs of improvements on the property and the construction of a new 
home from production of the property, had the use of George 
Fisher's cattle for at least five years, and when they borrowed 
money to complete the home, they borrowed it against cattle and 
equipment which had been paid for by proceeds of ranching and 
farming on the property which is in dispute. They raised cattle 
worth a big sum, paid for with a check which bounced (R. 429-430). 
There is no evidence of any substantial outside income or any 
outside assets other than the $30,000 received under the Mapco 
agreement and the $12,500 plus $1,000 per year under the Linmar 
agreement, which Defendants received under the contract to 
purchase. There is no evidence that the price of $124,000 was 
unreasonable or that the property today, including the home on it, 
is worth substantially more than it would be without the 
"improvements." The improvements made on the property were 
presumably made because they would make the property more 
productive, produce more income for the Defendants, and make the 
property more desirable for them to retain. These factors should 
be considered by this Court before determining whether forfeiture 
of the land at this juncture would be inequitable. 
As pointed out in our original Brief (Pp. 42-43), 
assuming that forfeiture would be inequitable, the usual remedy is 
to give the buyers additional time to pay the amount due. 
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Plaintiffs do not object to that so long as the payment is made now 
rather than far into the future, long after the death of LaRue 
Fisher and probably after the death of all the other parties to 
this litigation. 
The decision of the Trial Court (R. 249-258), although 
confusing as to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, was never 
analyzed or argued before the Court. The Court ruled that it was 
final (R. 273). The Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend the 
Judgment requested a transcript so that the testimony could be 
examined and compared with the findings and conclusions. This was 
dated October 28 and refused on November 4 before the Defendants 
had responded and without opportunity to discuss it with the Court 
(R. 275). Plaintiffs filed documents showing amortization schedule 
and the rate of inflation and how long would be involved if annual 
payments only started with the decision of the Court, and there is 
no evidence that the Court ever considered it. 
Defendants in their Brief cite two Utah cases that 
forfeiture is a harsh penalty and should be gingerly enforced, but 
also noting that the parties may contract for such terms as they 
can agree upon. Moonlake Elec. Ass'n. v. Ultrasystems W. 
Construction Co., 767 P.2d 125 (Utah App. 1988), and Russell v. 
Park City Utah Corp., 548 P.2d 889 (Utah 1976), (P. 32-33 of 
Appellees' Brief). 
These cases have no factual analogy to our case. Whether 
forfeiture is appropriate is a judgment decision. If forfeiture is 
inequitable, the usual relief in a land sale contract, as cited in 
-10-
our original Brief (Pp. 42-43), is to give the purchaser some 
additional time to complete the payments owing. The Trial Court 
has found the amount that is now owing and the purchasers have 
already had quite a bit of time to marshal their assets and arrange 
for payoff of the balance if it can be done. If the property is 
not worth the amount owing, there is no reason why it should not go 
back to the sellers. 
VI. SHOULD THE COURT HAVE ALLOWED APPELLANTS' ATTORNEY FEES? 
Defendants in their Brief simply request that the Court 
award attorneys fees to the Defendants. The Trial Judge apparently 
found that neither party had prevailed and so did not award 
attorneys fees. Plaintiffs submit that they had no course open to 
them except to bring the action as they did. They have not been 
denied relief but have been granted the relief which the Court 
found to be equitable, and that should have been sufficient under 
Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1983), cited in our original 
Brief at page 45. 
CONCLUSION 
It is plain that the Trial Judge made a painstaking 
decision and having made his decision, used some of the evidence 
leading to that decision as support. Plaintiffs don't seriously 
quarrel with the finding of an oral modification to give Defendants 
more time and do not squirm under the finding that forfeiture would 
be inequitable. The result of this should have been a holding that 
the payment with interest is due and payable and that Defendant 
should either come up with payment or give up the property. The 
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implication of the decision that payments of $10,000 per year are 
all that Plaintiffs are entitled to is completely unreasonable• If 
the interest due does not bear interest, the payments would require 
391/2 years of deflated money. If the interest which is owing should 
be compounded at a niggardly 5%, the contract would never be paid 
off. That result is grossly inequitable and the decision should be 
reversed, awarding attorneys fees to the Plaintiffs. 
RESPONSE TO CROSS-APPEAL 
This response will refer to certain of the issues raised 
by Defendants as stated in the Brief of Cross-Appellants. 
DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs recognize that the Statement of Facts is of an 
argumentative character and space does not permit refutation of a 
number of statements which are stated as facts but which are 
erroneous. For instance, on line 14, page 9, it is stated that the 
Defendants were "liable for the mortgage on the home that is now 
approximately $30f000f" when in fact the mortgage was on cattle and 
equipment which were acquired by the Defendants with income from 
the property itself. 
APPELLEES II: THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO APPLY THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO THE MAJORITY OF YEARLY 
INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS UNDER THE ESCROW AGREEMENT 
WHEN PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PURSUE ACTION WITHIN THE 
SIX YEAR PERIOD. 
Defendants argue that the statute of limitations serves 
a legitimate purpose in dealing with stale claims where not 
explained by some actions of the parties or preserved for some good 
reason. 
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Defendants cite four Utah cases upholding application of 
the statute of limitations. Not one of these cases deals with the 
sale of real property under a real estate contract which preserves 
title in the seller until payments have been completed. Plaintiffs 
addressed this question in their Memorandum in Support of their 
Motion for Summary Judgment, citing the following cases and the 
following authorities: CarJberry v. Trentham, 299 P.2d 966, 970 
(Calif. Ct.App. 1956); Dickerson v. Brewster, 399 P.2d 407 (Idaho 
1965); McKelvey v. Rodriguez, 134 P.2d 870 (Calif. Ct. App. 1943); 
Ash v. Utah, 572 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1977); Evans v. Johnson, 39 W.Va. 
299, 19 S.E. 623; 51 Am.Jur.2d, Limitation of Actions, U 406; 77 
Am.Jur.2d, Vendor and Purchaser, U 414; 54 C.J.S., Limitation of 
Actions, 1111 208 and 210 (R. 38-42). 
Defendants responded to this Memorandum with their own 
Memorandum, which attempted to distinguish the cited cases from 
Utah law, because the cases referred to "seisin" or "possession" 
(R. 110-111). 
In their further Memorandum on the Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Plaintiffs cited § 78-12-6, Utah Code Annotated (1953) as 
dealing with seisin or possession, and also Grayson Roper v. 
Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 469 (Utah 1989), (R. 130). 
The cases cited by Defendants in Appellees' Brief deal 
only with promissory notes and other contracts having installment 
payments and do not deal with any contracts for the sale of land 
where title is retained in the seller. The instant action is not 
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an action for installment payments but an action for forfeiture of 
the land for failure to meet the requirements of the Escrow 
Agreement. Seisin exists in the Plaintiffs and the action is 
within the statutory period, § 78-12-6, because the Plaintiff 
sellers still hold title to the property. 
If this Court rules that there was no oral modification 
of the agreement, it should also rule that the statute of 
limitations does not bar this type of action and should then 
consider whether a forfeiture as prayed for in the Complaint would 
be inequitable and what is the alternative for the Defendants to 
obtain title. 
APPELLEES III: THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY FAILED TO APPLY THE 
EQUITABLE DOCTRINES OF WAIVER, ESTOPPEL, AND LACHES 
IN THIS CASE WHEN GEORGE FISHER TOLD DEFENDANT NOT 
TO MAKE THE YEARLY INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS AND 
DEFENDANT ACTED IN RELIANCE UPON THESE REPRESENTA-
TIONS FOR APPROXIMATELY 15 YEARS WITHOUT REPRISAL. 
Defendants consider separately waiver, estoppel and 
laches, and we shall do the same. 
A. Waiver 
Defendants' Brief makes general statements about not 
requiring prompt payment of the installments, but refers to no 
evidence where "relinquishment" is addressed or is deducible. On 
page 17 the Brief states that George Fisher "commanded Max and 
Joyce not to pay under the terms of the Escrow Agreement but to 
reinvest the money into the property. The word "commanded" does 
not appear in any of the testimony and there is no evidence that 
the amounts of the annual payments were invested in the property. 
-14-
The only testimony concerning $10,000 invested was rejected by the 
Court as not established. (R. 253, LI. 7-10; 256, LI. 7-20) 
Then at page 20 Defendants' Brief states that George 
waived his rights for him and his wife "and his wife consented by 
her inaction to that waiver." The Brief refers to no evidence that 
the possibility of relinquishment was ever presented to LaRue 
Fisher so that her inaction could be considered acquiescence. 
The Brief cites only the case of Setter's, Inc. v. Deseret 
Federal Savings and Loan, 857 P.2d 935 (Utah 1993), on the subject 
of waiver. That case says the law on waiver in Utah is very 
confused, but does seem to say at page 940 that three elements are 
necessary: 
(1) An existing right, benefit, or advantage; (2) 
knowledge of its existence; and (3) an intention to 
relinquish the right. 
There is no doubt that the Plaintiffs knew of the existence of the 
right to payments, but the question of intent to relinquish is 
completely absent. 
The Court in its decision did not distinguish between 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and that is why Plaintiffs 
did not regard it as a final decision until the Court flatly stated 
that it was final. But it appears that the Court made the 
following statements, which should be considered as Findings, on 
the issue of waiver and perhaps also on the issues of estoppel and 
laches: 
17. In 1988 or 1989, Max and Joyce were 
contemplating building a new home. Max testified 
that at that time he knew he was still 
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obligated to make payments under the contract• 
(R. 253, LI. 22-24) 
Also, in 1979, Max maintains that he sold some 
of his cattle and the proceeds went to George and 
LaRue. This is a further indication that there was 
no agreement to forgive debt or to treat payments 
as gifts. All of this leads the Court to conclude 
that no agreement was ever made nor did the seller 
or buyer ever agree to forgive debts or to treat 
payments as gifts. (R. 254, LI. 4-7) 
The evidence indicates that the agreement 
between the parties in 1975, that is the oral 
agreement, was merely to delay payments rather than 
to forgive payments. (R. 254, LI. 9-10) 
She [LaRue] was certainly aware of all 
conversations between Max and George. She knew 
that payments had been postponed and that monies 
had been invested in the property. She did not 
believe that these payments had been forgiven or 
gifted. Under these circumstances, she also bound 
by the agreement to postpone payments. (R. 255, 
LI. 18-21) 
20. As previously stated, Max and Joyce 
continued to believe that they were obligated under 
the contract. (R. 256, L. 5) 
These appear to be Findings subject to the "clearly 
erroneous" standard of review and Defendants and Appellees Brief 
has marshalled no evidence and referred to no evidence of any 
intention to "relinquish" the payments. 
B. Estoppel. 
It is not clear what defendants are contending for 
under this heading. They cite two Utah cases, in the first one of 
which estoppel was enforced and in the second one, the Court held 
that there was no basis for estoppel. In that latter case, Cesco 
v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967 (Utah 1989), the 
plaintiff had indicated that it would endeavor to relieve the 
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defendant of payment and without abandoning its claim against the 
defendant so that the Court held there was no basis for estoppel. 
Likewise, in this case, there is no evidence of forgiveness of the 
debt and the Court held specifically that the debt had not been 
forgiven (R. 252, L. 8; 258, L. 22). The only question was when it 
would be paid. George Fisher said he "did not then need the money" 
(R. 251, L. 21), the contract payments were delayed and not 
forgiven (R. 252, L. 8). George told Max he would ask for the 
payments later (R. 254, L. 2), leaving open the question of when 
payments would be demanded and not whether. Also, Defendants' 
Brief under this heading says that "forfeiture" of the Defendants' 
interest would be unjust (P. 30). Actually, Defendants' argument 
on this point is a matter of equity and the form that equitable 
relief should take. 
Defendants do not argue the application of the statute of 
frauds to the issue of estoppel. Plaintiffs urged this upon the 
Trial Court, arguing that even though George Fisher's actions would 
form the basis for estoppel, that would not bind his joint tenant 
unless efforts had been made by the buyers to learn whether the 
other joint tenant acquiesced in the position of the one who was 
doing the talking. In that regard we cited Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24 
Utah 2d 39, 42-43, 465 P.2d 356 (Utah 1970), and the Court ruled 
that that case applied only where the modification of the agreement 
dealt directly with title to the land rather than to a term of the 
agreement. We submit that that case, as well as the following 
cases, are specific that the statute of frauds applies to any 
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material provision of the contract which is subject to the statute 
of frauds, and the Coombs v. Ouzounian case specifically says that 
a person cannot bind the non-speaking joint tenant on the theory of 
estoppel without going to that joint tenant and determining what 
his or her attitude is. See Allen v. Kingdon, 723 P.2d 394, 396 
(Utah 1986) and Zion's Properties v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 1322 
(Utah 1975) discussed at page 37-38 of our opening Brief. In this 
case it is plain that LaRue Fisher's attitude was contrary to the 
concessions that George Fisher was reportedly making. The Court 
found this at R. 253, L. 11; R. 254, L. 23; and R. 257, L. 25. If 
Max had gone to his mother to learn her attitude, as to which he 
was put on notice, he would have learned that she definitely wanted 
payments to be made as they fell due. 
If Max and Joyce Fisher had ever given any indication 
that they intended to get the ranch property without paying for it 
or intended to have title pass to them without paying for it, that 
would have commanded an immediate and definite response certainly 
from LaRue Fisher and probably from George Fisher. Max and Joyce 
were content to occupy the property, make their living from it 
without ever having to pay anything, and now they apparently want 
to continue that income-producing possession without paying for it. 
Defendants should be subject to estoppel. 
C. Laches. 
The only case cited by Defendants on this topic is 
Plateau Mining v. Utah Division of State Lands, 802 P.2d 720 at 731 
(Utah 1990), which case found there was no showing of laches but 
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said that it has two elements: "(1) lack of diligence on the part 
of the claimant and (2) an injury to the defendant because of the 
lack of diligence." It is true that there was lack of diligence on 
the part of both parties here. George Fisher permitted his son to 
remain on the land and utilize it without insisting that the agreed 
payments be made. Max and Joyce Fisher continued to enjoy the land 
and the profits from it without ever indicating to Max's father 
that they intended never to pay for the property. Plaintiff LaRue 
Fisher was completely ignored in their dealings, although it was 
known definitely to George and apparently known to Max that LaRue 
Fisher was not in harmony. There was no indication by George 
Fisher that he did not intend to exact the payments ultimately and 
no indication from Max Fisher that he did not intend to pay for the 
property ultimately. There was lack of diligence on both sides. 
On the other hand, George and LaRue Fisher were deprived 
of the benefit of their bargain, in that they did not receive the 
money they were entitled to in return for delivering up possession 
of the property. The father had difficulty handling the situation 
and the mother was reluctant to push both her husband and her son 
into a course of action which she thought was right. The Trial 
Judge recognized the problems of a family relationship in his 
decision (see R. 253 11 16). 
The Defendants make a statement about the policy of the 
law to enforce actions within six years, citing 78-12-23, Utah Code 
Annotated. Plaintiffs submit that the applicable statute is 
78-12-5, 5.2 and 6, Utah Code Annotated, which provides that an 
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action can be commenced if there has been seisin or possession of 
the property within seven years. This action is not to collect the 
installment payments but to enforce the forfeiture provisions of 
the contract for nonperformance. Whether forfeiture would be 
inequitable is a decision which lies within the discretion of this 
Court in reviewing the decision of the Trial Judge. If the land 
has not increased in value, Defendants cannot complain about 
turning it over after the productive use of it for twenty years. 
If it has become more valuable, Defendants can either sell the land 
and keep the profit or borrow against the land and pay off the 
Plaintiffs. The position of Plaintiffs is that after waiting 
twenty years with either one payment or no payments, depending on 
how the Court rules on the sale of cattle in 1979, but facing the 
prospect of payments at reduced dollars for either 391/2 years or 
forever, it is grossly inequitable. Since the interest has accrued 
and is now due, there appears to be no reason for not giving 
interest on the amount of interest that has accrued to date. 
Defendants appeal for equitable treatment. The Trial 
Court thought forfeiture was inequitable and gave the Defendants 
forever to pay out on deflated dollars. It is true that George 
Fisher was reluctant to quarrel with his oldest son, but he never 
forgave the debt and recognized that sooner or later Max must pay 
or forfeit. George isn't here to testify. The other parent, LaRue 
Fisher, didn't want an open quarrel with her husband, but she and 
the rest of the family now ask for performance. The Defendants 
have lived off the property, have received $45,000 in additional 
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cash, have taken advantage of the family situation and now want the 
whole property for $47,717.96. There is no equity in the 
Defendants' cross-appeal. 
APPELLEES V: PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO PROPERLY MARSHALLED THE 
EVIDENCE TO SHOW CLEAR ERROR ON THE FACTUAL ISSUES 
THEY WISH TO APPEAL. 
A. LaRue Fisher is Bound by the Actions of Her 
Husband. 
This subject was addressed under our Point II with 
the evidence marshalled at pages 15-18 and covered in our Argument 
at pages 34-36. The evidence is plain that LaRue Fisher at no time 
agreed to postponement of the payments in any form, but the 
evidence is equally plain that her position always was that the 
payments should be made as they fell due. Her own attitude is 
contained in the marshalled evidence. The fact that she did not 
make an independent demand against the Defendants is explained as 
involving a disagreement with her husband, which family situation 
needs to be taken into account in this proceeding. The holding 
that LaRue Fisher was bound by the actions of her husband, we 
submit, is a conclusion of law and this Court owes no deference to 
the conclusion of the Trial Court. 
B. The Proceeds of the Cattle Sale in 1979 Were 
Properly Credited to an Escrow Payment. 
We don't understand the statement of Appellees that 
we failed to marshal the evidence on this point. Our Brief at page 
4 states that this finding is entitled to great deference and the 
evidence is marshalled at pages 20-22 of our Brief. It is admitted 
that Max and Joyce testified that the cattle sold were their cattle 
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and LaRue Fisher testified that the cattle sold belonged to her and 
her husband. The documentary evidence and the treatment of the 
cattle sale, so far as accounting and income taxes were concerned, 
all showed that the sale was treated in 1979 by all parties as the 
sale of the George Fisher cattle. At that time there was no 
dispute existing as to whose cattle were sold. The evidence at 
that time all showed that the cattle were the George Fisher cattle. 
Our argument is that to accept the testimony of Max and Joyce 
Fisher against the strong evidence as of the time of the sale shows 
an error in the judgment of the Trial Court. The treatment of the 
cattle sale in 1979 was false by Max and Joyce Fisher if, in fact, 
the cattle were theirs because they wanted to avoid income tax. We 
submit the documentary evidence, the evidence at the time of the 
sale, the testimony of LaRue Fisher, and the motives of Max and 
Joyce Fisher combined to be sufficient to overturn the conclusion 
of the Trial Judge that the cattle belonged to the Defendants. 
APPELLEES VI: IN FINDING THAT THE CONTRACT HAD BEEN MODIFIED, THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONCLUDING THAT INTEREST 
CONTINUED TO ACCRUE ON THE CONTRACT PRINCIPLE WHEN 
ALL THE EVIDENCE INDICATED THAT CONTINUED ACCRUAL 
WAS NEVER CONTEMPLATED BY THE PARTIES, GEORGE 
FISHER DID NOT EXPECT INTEREST TO ACCRUE AND THE 
PAYMENTS WERE WAIVED BY BOTH GEORGE AND LARUE 
FISHER. 
The Appellees state two subheads under this point: A. 
No evidence supports Trial Court's factual finding that the parties 
agreed to pay interest, and B. George Fisher waived continued 
accrual of interest. 
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There is no doubt as to the agreement to pay interest. 
This was contained in the Escrow Agreement, which is Exhibit P-l, 
which provides on page 1 dealing with the installment payments: 
Said payments, which include interest at the rate 
of five percent (5%) per annum, will be applied 
first to interest and then to principal. 
It is true that in the conversations between Max and George, there 
was no agreement that interest would be paid, as that was covered 
by the Escrow Agreement. The Trial Court made no finding that 
interest was not waived and made no finding that interest was 
accruing. This was assumed and the Court's only statement was that 
there was no gift of the interest (R. 256, LI. 12-14). The only 
testimony on interest was that of Mr. Oman at R. 526, where LaRue 
Fisher stated, in the absence of Max and Joyce, that the Defendants 
should make the payments plus interest on the payments and George 
Fisher reportedly said, "I don't think we should charge interest on 
it." This is certainly no waiver of interest. It is the contrary 
so far as LaRue Fisher is concerned. Mr. Oman testified that that 
conversation was communicated to Max Fisher (R. 530, L. 3). 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs submit that this is an action for forfeiture 
for nonpayment of the contract and the only applicable statute of 
limitations is 78-12-6 (or 5 and 5.2), Utah Code Annotated. If 
that is correct, the entire balance, including interest, must have 
been paid to avoid the forfeiture under the Escrow Agreement. 
Plaintiffs submit that the Court overlooked the equities 
in favor of Plaintiffs and the vast income Defendants have had from 
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the land, without putting any outside assets into it, in holding 
that forfeiture would be inequitable• The Defendants have made 
their living from the land and from that living have raised cattle, 
made improvements, replaced the home, received $30,000 from Mapco, 
$19,500 from Linmar, $24,980 for cattle in 1979, received a big but 
bogus check for cattle in 1981 (R. 429-430), always had money in 
the bank, and paid the Sellers either nothing or the proceeds from 
a few of the cattle raised on the farm. Plaintiffs have received 
nothing or almost nothing and yet the Trial Court found forfeiture 
to be inequitable. That is a conclusion this Court must review, 
without deference. 
And only then must the Court consider whether a payoff 
schedule starting 20 years late and continuing for either 391/2 years 
or into perpetuity, depending on whether interest is allowed on 
delinquent interest, is reasonable. There is no evidence that 
George Fisher and Max Fisher contemplated this result and the only 
evidence on the subject is that George contemplated that Max would 
either pay up or forfeit the property. 
The issues of the cattle payment in 1979 and attorney's 
fees are not abandoned. 
Defendants have cross-appealed from a decision which 
ignored the equities in favor of the Plaintiffs in denying 
forfeiture. They have lived off the property for twenty years, 
claiming one challenged payment from cattle raised on the property, 
with provision to start paying with cheap dollars at the old rate, 
which will take forever, with another year's possession during 
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appeal time, with no award of attorney fees, and they have cross-
appealed! They have already upset the whole family and now they 
want the family farm and ranch for a measly $47,717.96. 
This Court should reverse the Trial Court by holding that 
payments plus interest are in default and under the Escrow 
Agreement forfeiture is appropriate. This would not be 
inequitable. If this Court holds forfeiture to be inequitable, it 
should give Defendants a reasonable time to pay or else. The Trial 
Court found the notice to be sufficient. The statute of 
limitations does not bar the action and Defendants show no basis 
for waiver, estoppel or laches. Plaintiffs should have attorney's 
fees in the Trial Court and in this Court. 
DATED this 21st day of April, 1995. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP, a P.C. 
Richard L. Bird, Jr 
Lon Rodney Kump 
333 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2988 
Telephone: (801) 328-8987 
Attorneys for Appellants and 
Cross-Appellees 
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